This paper estimates how large fiscal-policy changes have to be to solve the U.S. government deficit problem. This question is complicated in part because of endogeneity issues. A fiscal-policy change designed to decrease the deficit has effects on the macro economy, which in turn affects the deficit. Any analysis of fiscal-policy proposals must take these effects into account: one needs a model of the economy. This paper uses a macroeconometric model of the world economy to examine the deficit problem. A base run is first obtained in which there are no major changes in U.S. fiscal policy. This results in an ever increasing debt/GDP ratio. Then net taxes (taxes minus transfers) are increased by an amount sufficient to stabilize the longrun debt/GDP ratio. The increases are linearly phased in over a three-year period beginning in the first quarter of 2012.
Introduction
At the time of this writing (June 2011) almost everyone agrees that without major fiscal-policy changes, the U.S. economy is on an unsustainable long-run path.
Without major changes, the U.S. government debt to GDP ratio is expected to rise without limit. See, for example, Penner (2011) and CBO (2011). Many expect negative asset-market reactions at some point in the future if the deficit problem is not solved, at which time drastic steps may have to be taken. This paper estimates how large fiscal-policy changes have to be to solve the deficit problem. This question is complicated in part because of endogeneity issues.
A fiscal-policy change designed to decrease the deficit has effects on the macro economy, which in turn affects the deficit. Any analysis of fiscal-policy proposals must take these effects into account: one needs a model of the economy. This paper uses a macroeconometric model of the world economy, denoted the "MC model," to examine the deficit problem. A base run is first obtained in which there are no major changes in U.S. fiscal policy. This results in an ever increasing debt/GDP ratio. Then net taxes (taxes minus transfers) are increased to the point where the long-run debt/GDP ratio is constant. The increases are linearly phased in over a three-year period beginning in the first quarter of 2012.
The estimates of the needed net tax increases are large. Compared to values in the base run, net taxes after the phase in need to be about $650 billion higher each year in 2011 dollars. In percentage terms this translates into about 45 percent of personal income taxes, 51 percent of social security taxes, 24 percent of transfer payments to state and local governments and to persons, 44 percent of purchases of goods and services, and 176 percent of corporate profit taxes. The output loss is 1.38 percent of real GDP over the 9 years analyzed.
The main results are reported in Section 5. In Section 6 alternative experiments and base runs are examined, and in Section 7 uncertainty estimates are presented.
Some Preliminaries
The main items in the federal government budget are easy to describe. In the first quarter of 2011 the government had income of $2.47 trillion, of which $0.99 trillion was personal income taxes and $0.91 trillion was social security taxes. (All numbers used here are at annual rates and are from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Table 3 .2, last revised May 26, 2011.) Of the remaining $0.57 trillion, $0.11 trillion was indirect business taxes and $0.26 trillion was corporate profit taxes. The government spent $3.76 trillion, of which $1.05 trillion was purchases of goods and services, $1.74 trillion was transfer payments to persons, and $0.52 trillion was transfer payments to state and local governments. Interest payments were $0.31 trillion. The deficit was $1.29 trillion. From these numbers, the value of net taxes defined to be personal income and social security taxes minus transfer payments to persons and state and local governments was negative: −$0.36 trillion. The federal government thus paid more in transfers than it collected in personal income taxes and social security taxes in the first quarter of 2011. This paper will use increases in net taxes to lower the deficit. Another possibility would be to raise corporate profit taxes. As the above numbers reveal, however, these taxes are a small fraction of total revenue. Even a substantial increase in 3 corporate profit tax rates would not go very far in solving the deficit problem.
Results are presented in Table 1 below that show the amount of corporate profit taxes collected in the base run (where there is no increase in corporate profit tax rates). As a rough approximation, if these taxes were increased from the base run in a deficit reduction plan, an equivalent decrease in net taxes could be made.
A second alternative possibility for lowering the deficit would be to cut government purchases of goods and services, of which the largest component is defense. Federal transfer payments (grants in aid) to state and local governments are included in the definition of net taxes in this paper. The implicit assumption here is that state and local governments pass these payments on to persons in the form of transfer payments: state and local governments are simply treated as intermediaries. This is not completely the case since grants in aid go in part to fund state and local government purchases of goods and services. The assumption needed 1 All ratios in this paper have been multiplied by 100 and so are in percentage points. in this paper is that any decrease in grants in aid to state and local governments in a deficit reduction plan shows up as a decrease in state and local government transfer payments to persons: the decreases are assumed to be passed on.
Most state and local governments are required to run balanced budgets, and in the aggregate this is true. to roughly balanced budgets. These spending values and tax rates have not been changed for the deficit reduction plans, and each run corresponds to roughly a balanced budget for the state and local governments. Grants in aid have not been decreased for any of the experiments, but the results in this paper are consistent with a plan that decreases grants in aid as long as these grants are passed on in the form of decreased transfer payments to persons. The key assumption is simply that state and local governments in the aggregate run roughly balanced budgets.
A useful income concept for present purposes is income before both federal and state and local government net taxes, which will be denoted Y H. It is defined to be (using NIPA Table 2 .1) the sum of 1) compensation of employees, 2) proprietors' If the debt/GDP ratio is to be stabilized, at what value should this be? Is there 2 The huge fall in the ratio in 1975:2 in Figure 3 is due to the effects of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, 3 The measure of debt used here is the one used in the MC model, which is based on data from the U.S. Flow of Funds Accounts (variable −AG in the model). It is the debt in the hands of the public. GDP is equal to the nominal interest rate on the debt, the debt/GDP ratio will not change. Net taxes do not have to be raised to pay the interest to keep the ratio constant since both the debt and GDP are growing at the same rate if the primary deficit is zero. In this sense there is no net tax cost to any debt/GDP ratio, however large. One possible cost to a large (but stable) debt/GDP ratio is a large net tax increase needed to keep the debt/GDP ratio unchanged if the interest rate exceeds the growth rate. The larger the ratio, the more sensitive is the government budget to bad shocks that affect the growth rate more than the interest rate. In particular, asset markets, including the market for U.S. government bonds, may be more sensitive to bad shocks the larger is the debt/GDP ratio-fearing that the government may not be able to raise net taxes enough to keep the debt/GDP ratio constant if the ratio is already large.
It will be seen that the value at which the debt/GDP ratio stabilizes is larger the longer one waits to begin increasing net taxes. There is no cost to waiting in the sense that once one begins, there is a path of net tax increases that will stabilizes the debt/GDP ratio. Again, to the extent there are costs, they are costs of increased sensitivity. This paper does not have anything to say about how large is too large. The MC model is not just a series of ad hoc regressions. In the theory behind the model households maximize expected utility and firms maximize expected profits.
The theory is used to choose left hand side and right hand side variables in the equations to be estimated. The estimated equations are taken to be approximations to the decision equations of agents. The theory leads to many exclusion restrictions in the estimated equations, and lack of identification is not an issue. Expectations are assumed to be adaptive, and under this assumption the Lucas critique is not an issue. This methodology of structural macroeconometric modeling goes back at least to Tinbergen (1939) . It differs from the currently popular DSGE methodology in that the latter imposes rational expectations and uses theory in a tighter way. The present methodology and the DSGE methodology are compared in Fair (2011) , and this discussion will not be repeated here. There are also important physical stock effects in the model. There are four physical stock variables: durables, housing, capital, and inventories. Lagged one period, the stock of durables has a negative effect on durable expenditures, the stock of housing has a negative effect on housing investment, the stock of capital has a negative effect on plant and equipment investment, and the stock of inventories has a negative effect on inventory investment. These stock effects mitigate contractions and tame expansions. As physical stocks fall in a contraction, there is, other things being equal, an increased demand to replenish them, which helps counteract the contraction. The opposite happens in an expansion. All these stock effects are estimated-again no calibration. Another way of looking at these stock effects is that the model has built in cyclical features. As, say, net tax increases contract the economy and stocks are drawn down, forces are at work that will expand the economy later.
The ROW model consists of estimated equations for 37 countries. There are up to 13 estimated equations per country and 16 identities. The estimated equations explain total imports, consumption, fixed investment, inventory investment, the domestic price level, the demand for money, a short term interest rate, a long term interest rate, the spot exchange rate, the forward exchange rate, the export price level, employment, and the labor force. The specifications are similar across countries. The short term interest rate for each country is explained by an estimated interest rate rule for that country. In some cases the U.S. interest rate is 
Some Properties
The U.S. output multiplier for a change in U.S. government purchases of goods and services is about 2.0 after four quarters and then falls thereafter. (For all the fiscal-policy effects reported in this paper, the estimated interest rate rule of the Fed is included in the model-monetary policy is endogenous.) The multiplier for a change in the personal income tax rate is about 1.0 after four quarters and then falls thereafter. The same is true for a change in government transfer payments to persons. If the interest rate rule is dropped and the short term interest rate is increased by 1 percentage point, real output falls by about 0.4 percent after four 14 quarters and about 0.7 percent after eight quarters. Monetary policy has important effects on the economy, but not enough to come close to eliminating cycles. This is discussed in Fair (2005) .
Regarding the aggregate marginal personal income tax rate in the model (denoted D1GM ) and federal transfer payments to persons, there are different effects in the model from increasing D1GM versus decreasing transfer payments, but these effects are second order quantitatively. Interest rates appear in the demand equations multiplied by one minus D1GM , and the wage rate appears in the labor supply equations multiplied by one minus D1GM . There are thus effects from changing the exogenous personal income tax rate in the model (which changes D1GM ) that are absent when the level of transfer payments is changed. For example, in the labor supply equations the after-tax wage rate has a positive effect on labor supply (substitution effect dominating), and so an increase in the personal income tax rate has a different effect on the unemployment rate than does an equivalent size decrease in transfer payments because of different effects on labor supply. Similarly, there are different demand effects because of the use of the after-tax interest rates. However, the main effect of increasing the personal income tax rate or decreasing transfer payments is the decrease in disposal personal income, which is an explanatory variable in the consumption and housing investment equations.
When net taxes are increased for the experiments, this is done by decreasing transfer payments to persons, not by increasing the personal income tax rate. In practice if there are increases in tax rates, the estimated effects in this paper will be a little off because the second order effects mentioned above are being ignored. There are no major changes in asset prices in the base run. The estimated equation for the change in U.S. stock prices and the estimated equations for exchange rates explain very little of the variance of the variables, and the predictions from them are close to simply no change or no change with drift. Oil prices of the oil exporting countries are exogenous, and these prices have been assumed to grow at modest rates. There is an exogenous U.S. relative housing price variable, and it has been assumed to grow at a modest rate.
It is important to emphasize that the base run assumes no bad asset market reactions even though in this run the debt/GDP ratio continually increases. Assetprice changes are essentially unpredictable, and it would be arbitrary to add large asset-price shocks to the base run. The base run is thus not necessarily realistic in this sense. It is a baseline from which the effects of net tax increases can be estimated.
Note also that the base run is not completely in line with existing laws. For example, the Bush tax cuts have been assumed to remain after 2012, contrary to current legislation. Also, it may be that the assumed growth rate of federal transfer payments to persons is too low given the aging of the population and current health care legislation. Figure 3 shows the net effect of the tax rate and transfer payment assumptions used for the base run. The net tax path is high by recent standards but low by historical standards. Again, the base run is simply a baseline to examine net tax increase effects.
Results for the base run are presented in Table 1 The second page of Table 1 shows net taxes as a percent of income Y H, which is also plotted in Figure 3 • 9-year real GDP loss in 2011 dollars relative to the base run: $2.01 trillion (1.38 percent).
• g = real GDP, four quarter percent change.
• u = unemployment rate.
• π = GDP deflator, four quarter percent change.
• r = three-month Treasury bill rate.
• def = federal government deficit (NIPA) as a percent of GDP.
• debt = federal government debt as a percent of GDP.
• %nettax = net taxes a a percent of income Y H.
• int = federal government interest payments as a percent of GDP.
• sh = household financial saving rate.
• nettax = net taxes.
• ptax = personal income taxes.
• stax = social security taxes.
• tran = transfer payments to persons and state and local governments.
• purg = purchases of goods and services.
• ctax = corporate profit taxes.
The third page of Table 1 presents various variables in 2011 dollars. 5 This page is discussed in the next section.
There are two features of the base run's predictions of the macro economy that differ from what at least some people expect at the time of this writing. First, the predictions of future inflation are higher than the current consensus view. Second, the future household saving rate is perhaps higher than consensus. In Section 6 two alternative base runs are analyzed, one with lower inflation and one with a lower saving rate. It will be seen that the estimates of the increases in net taxes needed to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio are not sensitive to these alternative runs.
The value at which the debt/GDP ratio is stabilized, however, does differ across runs. It is possible to estimate standard errors using a bootstrap procedure, and this is discussed in Section 7. It will be seen that the estimated standard errors are small.
24
It turned out that raising net taxes by 4 percent of GDP was enough to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio. 6 The increases were linearly phased in over three years beginning in 2012:1. The results are presented in columns labeled (2) in Table 1 .
The increase in net taxes is contractionary, as expected. As the fourth page of Table 1 notes, the sum of real GDP in 2011 dollars over the 9 years is $2.01 trillion lower than it is in the base run, which is 1.38 percent of the sum of real GDP in 2011 dollars over the 9 years in the base run. The unemployment rate is higher, inflation is lower, and the interest rate is lower. The interest rate is lower because the interest rate set by the Fed is estimated to respond negatively to the higher unemployment and negatively to the lower inflation. Although the lower interest rate mitigates the contraction from the net tax increase, it by no means eliminates it. As noted in Section 3, effects of interest rate changes on the economy are not large enough to eliminate recessions or to completely eliminate the negative effects on output of a net tax increase of the size considered here.
The deficit as a fraction of GDP at the end of 2020 is 4.03 percent versus 9.41 percent in the base run. The debt/GDP ratio stabilizes at 65.5 percent. (This is the good news.) The second page of Table 1 shows that net taxes as a fraction of income Y H is 5.54 percent at the end of 2020 versus 0.74 percent in the base run. 6 Remember that the value of net taxes was increased by decreasing federal transfer payment to persons, an exogenous variable. But, as discussed in Section 3, aside from second order effects one can also think of this as raising taxes by the same amount. Either way, disposable personal income is decreased, which is the main link to household consumption and housing investment. Disposable personal income would also be decreased if federal transfer payments to state and local governments were decreased as long as state and local governments passed the decrease on to persons.
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Federal interest payments as a fraction of GDP at the end of 2020 is 3.45 percent versus 5.24 percent in the base run. The saving rate is 3.41 percent at the end of 2020 versus 6.68 percent in the base run-some of the increase in net taxes comes out of savings.
The third page of Table 1 is a compromise of half personal income tax increases and half transfer payment decreases, this would be a 22.5 percent increase in personal income taxes and a 12 percent decrease in transfer payments (from the base run). Since transfer payments as used here include grants in aid to state and local governments, the 12 percent decrease would be for both federal transfer payments to persons and federal grants in aid to state and local governments.
Another way of looking at the size of the net tax increases is to consider the sum over 10 years. This is often done when discussing deficit reduction plans, although it is not always clear if the sum is in nominal or real terms and if it takes into account the growth of the economy through population increases and increases in per capita income. The increases in net taxes in Table 1 If federal purchases of goods and services are cut by 1 percent of GDP with net taxes increased by 3 percent of GDP rather than 4 percent, the debt/GDP ratio again stabilizes, but at a larger value-67.4 percent versus 65.5 percent. The real GDP loss is larger in this case because the multiplier for a decrease in purchases of goods and services is larger in absolute value than it is for an increase in net taxes. The real GDP loss over the 9 years is 2.01 percent versus 1.38 percent. The debt/GDP ratio is higher in part because taxable income is lower.
As mentioned in Section 5, the future household saving rates in the base run may be higher than some people expect. Figure 5 shows that the rates are high relative to historical behavior. An alternative base run was made in which the service consumption and nondurable consumption equations were shocked to result in more consumption, driving the saving rate in the prediction period to about 3 percent from 6 percent. The net tax increase of 4 percent of GDP was then imposed on this base run. In this case the net tax increase drove the saving rate to about zero. This is consistent with the results in Table 1 , where the fall in the saving rate is about 3 percentage points. In this base run the debt/GDP ratio is 87.9 percent in 2020:4 versus 91.8 percent in the regular base run. It is lower because of the stronger economy. The debt/GDP ratio was stabilized at 61.4 percent versus 65.5 percent in the regular case. This example shows that the more expansive the economy is-the more expansive the base run-the lower is the long-run debt/GDP ratio, other things being equal.
It was also mentioned in Section 5 that inflation in the base run is higher than consensus. An alternative base run was made in which the U.S. price equation was shocked to result in lower inflation. In this base run the inflation rate is never higher than 2.7 percent (versus a maximum of 4.02 percent in Table 1 ), and at the end of 2020 the GDP deflator is 11.4 percent lower than it is in the regular base run. In this case the debt/GDP ratio is 95.2 percent in 2020:4 versus 91.8 percent in the regular base run. As expected, inflation has a negative effect on the debt/GDP ratio, so lowering it results in a higher ratio. The effect is not huge, however, and so increased inflation is not really an answer to a growing debt/GDP ratio, at least not in the MC model. The debt/GDP ratio was stabilized at 68.6 percent versus 65.5 percent in the regular case, using the same net tax increase of 4 percent of GDP.
The additional experiments in this section thus do not modify the main conclusion of this paper, namely that it takes a net tax increase of about 4 percent of GDP to stabilize the long-run debt/GDP ratio. The main effect of the experiments is to change the value at which the debt/GDP ratio stabilizes.
Uncertainty Estimates
A key question from the point of view of this paper is how much confidence to place on the estimated effects of the net tax increases. Take, for example, the effect on the debt/GDP ratio for 2020:4 in Table 1- The procedure was carried out for the net tax increase experiment in Table 1 using 100 trials. The computer time taken was about 7 hours on a laptop with a fairly fast chip. There were no solution failures. There are thousands of standard errors estimated, one for the effect on each endogenous variable in each quarter.
The following are three estimates. First, the estimated standard error for the −26.3 difference mentioned above is 1.95. Second, the estimated effect on the household saving rate for 2020:4 on the second page of Table 1 is −3.27 percentage points (3.41 minus 6.68), and the estimated standard error of this differnce is 0.39. Third, the estimated standard error of the sum of the output loss over the 9 years of $2.01 trillion is $216 billion.
These estimated standard errors are fairly small. This is in fact not surprising given results in Fair (2004) , which show that uncertainty from estimated coefficients is generally small relative to uncertainty from structural error terms. The uncertainty regarding the effects of the net tax increase is from the uncertainty of the coefficient estimates in the MC model and not also from the uncertainty of the structural error terms because the latter cancel out when computing the effects. 7 More confidence can thus be placed on the estimated effects of the net tax increase, alternative run minus base run, than on the path of the base run itself. This is fortunate, since the main interest is on the estimated effects. period-152 quarters-in common, and this period is taken to be the "base" period.
These 152 observations onû t are used for the draws in the bootstrap procedure discussed below. Using the solution values as the new data set, the 1,626 equations are reestimated.
Given these new coefficient estimates and the new data, the net tax increase experiment is performed for the 2012:1-2020:4 period-as in Table 1 . 10 The effects 
